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The argument of this paper is that international courts, when pressured to
act quickly on behalf of a victim whose human rights may have been infringed,
will tend to disregard the requirements of international law in order to provide
some immediate assistance to the victim. “Provisional measures,” which require
the international court or the human rights body to act quickly to avoid serious,
imminent, irreparable damage to persons, tend to be the chosen legal instrument
for such action. Provisional measures are normally granted within weeks or
sometimes in as short as one day, whereas the decision on a case can take years,
or even decades.1 As one commentator noted, “[W]hen there is a possibility of
imminent and irreparable harm to persons, the protective aspect of provisional
measures may be of more value than the compensatory function of a final
judgment.”2
BACKGROUND
In 1979, when I first started to work as a staff lawyer at the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission or Commission),
when we received a new petition, we determined whether the Commission had
jurisdiction over the potential case and whether the petition was prima facie
admissible in order to begin to process it. That meant that the respondent State
against which the petition was filed had to be a member state of the Organization

*Retired Principal Specialist of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of
American States (1979-2012). Adjunct Professor at Georgetown U. Law Centre (2005-present); CoChair of the “Human Rights in Times of Emergency” Committee of the International Law Association;
Member of the Board of Directors of Amnesty International USA. This paper is a more extensive
version of a presentation made at the U. of Notre Dame Law School on February 21, 2020.
1 See Nelson C. Sanchez & Laura L. Cerón, The Elephant in the Room: The Procedural Delay in the
Individual Petitions System of the Inter-American System, in THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM, CHANGING TIMES, ONGOING CHALLENGES (Due Process of Law Foundation, 2016).
2 JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN CT. OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 253 (Cambridge U. Press, 2d ed. 2013).
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of American States, that the petitioner had to have alleged a violation of a human
right set forth in either the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (American Declaration)3 or the American Convention of Human Rights
(ACHR),4 that the petitioner had to have attempted to exhaust domestic remedies
(i.e., attempted to secure redress through the national court system, having taken
the case to the highest court in the system), that the petitioner had come to the
Inter-American Commission within six months from the date of notification of
the judgment of the highest court in the national system, and that the subject of
the petition was not pending in another international proceeding.5 These are all
jurisdictional and admissibility requirements. Of course, there were exceptions
to the admissibility requirements.6 If the domestic legal system did not provide
for remedies for the alleged violation, then the exhaustion of domestic remedies
rule could not and did not apply, or if there was an unwarranted delay in
rendering a final judgment or if the petitioner had been denied access to the
remedies under domestic law, then exhaustion of domestic remedies was
inapplicable.7 Similarly, if the petition was substantially the same as one
previously processed by the Inter-American Commission or by another
international organization, then it should be considered inadmissible, although
this rule was breached more often than observed both by the Inter-American
Commission and other international organizations.
The respondent State may contest the petitioner’s argument in favor of
jurisdiction and admissibility and may present preliminary objections thereto.
Once the preliminary objections are taken into consideration along with the
petitioner’s defense of jurisdiction and admissibility, the case is declared
admissible or inadmissible. These details give the reader an impression of the
hoops the petitioner had to jump through for the international human rights body
to open a case.
Processing individual petitions did not begin to take on importance in the
inter-American system until after 1991, when the governments of the OAS
member states, except Cuba, celebrated, in Santiago, Chile, the fact that they
were all democratically elected governments.8 The admissibility of a petition
3 See Nature and Purposes (Art. 1), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Approved by Resolution No. 447 of the OAS
General Assembly at its ninth regular session, La Paz, Bolivia, October 1979),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/statuteiachr.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020); See also
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948); OAS Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System (Updated to September 30, 2014), OEA/Ser L/V/1.4 rev.13
(2014), http://www.cidh.oas.org.
4 See generally Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 at 1 [hereinafter ACHR]; reprinted in Basic Documents,
supra note 3, at 25-46; see also 1144 U.N.T.S 1. No. 17955 (1979).
5 See ACHR supra note 4, at art. 46.
6 If the State against which the petition was presented was not a member state of the Organization of
American States, or if a violation of a right was alleged that was not included in the ACHR or the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, or one of the other Inter-American human
rights treaties, then the Commission would not have jurisdiction over the case or the country.
7 See ACHR supra note 4, at arts. 46(2) and 47.
8 See The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, OAS
GA.
3d
plenary
sess.,
June
4,
1991,
OEA/Ser.P,
AG/RES.
(XXI-O/91),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03805E01.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). Cuba is a founding
member state of the Organization of American States, which was suspended from participation in OAS
activities from 1962-2009. After the lifting of the suspension in 2009, Cuba expressed no interest in
returning to the Organization.
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before the Inter-American Commission only made sense in a democratic State,
where impartial and independent courts functioned and domestic remedies could
be exhausted. Under the numerous military regimes in the region in the 1970s
and 80s, military courts had replaced ordinary courts and their lack of
independence and impartiality prevented them from affording due process and
fair trial guarantees.
I. THE SUPERVISORY HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
The individual petition procedure was invented in 1950 by the Europeans
when they adopted the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) under
the aegis of the Council of Europe.9 The ECHR created two organs, a Human
Rights Commission and a Human Rights Court, based in Strasbourg, France,
and there would be a member of the Commission and a judge on the Court for
every State party to the ECHR. To prevent a recurrence of the atrocities suffered
during World War II, and especially the Holocaust, the Europeans were the first
to accept legally binding obligations and the establishment of an international
body to which people could apply when their rights were endangered or violated
by their own governments. This unprecedented granting of standing to
individuals under international law was considered revolutionary at the time, as
prior thereto only States had standing under international law.
Both organs of the European system were part-time bodies and from the
travaux preparatoires, we know that the drafters believed that recourse to the
Court would be a rare occurrence. States, it was thought, would comply with the
recommendations of the European Commission and recourse to the European
Court would be infrequent.
The Inter-American Commission was created in 1959, without the benefit
of the prior adoption of a legally binding human rights treaty.10 The interAmerican system, in 1948, had adopted the American Declaration, a declaration
that pre-dated the adoption of the UDHR by seven months, but it was a
declaration and not intended to be legally binding. The Inter-American
Commission, however, and the Inter-American Court, take the position that
despite having been adopted as a declaration and not as a treaty, today the
American Declaration constitutes a source of international obligations for the
member states of the OAS.11 The Commission maintains that the American
Declaration creates legal obligations, or in other words, is legally binding on all

9 See [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953.
10 The OAS created the Inter-American Commission in 1959 by a Resolution of the Fifth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, eleven years after the adoption of the American
Declaration and approximately eight months after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. The Fifth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs took place in Santiago, Chile from Aug. 1218,
1959.
See
Final
Act,
Doc.
OEA/Ser.C/II.5,
http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/minutes.asp (last visited
July 28, 2020).
11 See Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. at 12-13 (1987); Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra
et al., Case 9903, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/01 ¶ 46-49 (2001); Interpretation of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 10, ¶ 35-45 (July 14, 1989).
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OAS member states.12 It is important to note in this context, however, that the
United States, for example, considers the American Declaration “a nonbinding
instrument” that does “not create legal rights or impose legal duties on member
states of the Organization of American States.”13 In addition, the US considers
the Commission’s precautionary measures to constitute a “nonbinding
recommendation.”14
Following the end of World War II, there was no consensus in the
international community in favor of the elaboration and adoption of an
international human rights treaty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the consensus document, was a declaration, not a treaty. Eleanor
Roosevelt, Chair of the first UN Human Rights Commission that adopted the
UDHR, characterized the UDHR as “a standard of achievement.”15
The Cold War prevented the adoption of a single legally binding treaty to
give force to the rights set forth in the UDHR. The UN International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)16 and the UN International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)17were both adopted in 1966
and split the rights protected in the UDHR in two, with the West supporting the
ICCPR and the East (USSR, etc.) supporting the ICESCR. Both treaties entered
into force ten years later, in 1976. The US did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992,
and it has never ratified the ICESCR. Republican party politicians in the US, in
general, do not recognize economic, social, and cultural rights as human rights.
The right to file an individual petition before the UN Human Rights Committee
was not included in the text of the ICCPR but was added by the first Optional
Protocol. The US has not become a party to the first Optional Protocol;
consequently, if a person wishes to file a complaint at the international level
about human rights violations in the US, the only available option is to do so
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

12 According to the Inter-American Commission the legal status of the American Declaration is: “[T]he
American Declaration is, for the Member States not parties to the American Convention, the source of
international obligations related to the OAS Charter. The Charter of the Organization gave the IACHR
the principal function of promoting the observance and protection of human rights in the Member
States. Article 106 of the OAS Charter does not, however, list or define those rights. The General
Assembly of the OAS at its Ninth Regular Period of Sessions, held in La Paz, Bolivia, in October 1979,
agreed that those rights are those enunciated and defined in the American Declaration. Therefore, the
American Declaration crystallizes the fundamental principles recognized by the American States. The
OAS General Assembly has also repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source of
international obligations for the Member States of the OAS.” Russell Bucklew, Case 12.958, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.168, doc. 81 ¶ 60, (2018),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp?Year=2018 (last visited July 28, 2020).
13 Id. at ¶ 14.
14 Id. Commentators such as Antkowiak and Gonza, similarly consider the Commission’s decisions
under both the Declaration and the ACHR to have the force of recommendations that are not legally
binding. See Thomas M. Antkowiak & Alejandra Gonza, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS 9 (2017).
15 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
16 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
17 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (last visited
July 28, 2020).
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After the adoption of the two UN Covenants, the OAS, in 1969, adopted the
ACHR, which gave a treaty basis to the Inter-American Commission and created
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Today, all Spanish-speaking
countries in the OAS are state parties to the ACHR and have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, whereas most Englishspeaking countries are not parties to the ACHR.18 The ACHR entered into force
in 1978, 42 years ago. The US is the only founding member of the OAS that is
not a party to the ACHR but is considered subject to the Inter-American
Commission’s jurisdiction under the American Declaration.
Today, as a condition of membership in the Council of Europe, every State
must also become a party to the ECHR, and all 47 member states are. This same
requirement does not exist in the inter-American system and deprives the system
of the necessary universality of participation that the European system enjoys.
The Inter-American Commission’s Statute was drafted by the OAS member
states and sets forth the structure, membership, general functions, and powers of
the Commission.19 The Statute can only be amended by the OAS member states.
The Inter-American Commission’s Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, are
drafted by the members of the Commission and set forth more precise functions
and can be amended by the Inter-American Commission at will.20
The ACHR requires that the procedure before the Inter-American
Commission be completed before a case can be brought to the Inter-American
Court. The Commission procedure ends with a decision on the merits, a friendly
settlement, or the case is filed (archived) if the petitioner fails to continue to
participate in the case or some other reason calls for it to be ended. Under the
treaty, only the Inter-American Commission or a state party to the ACHR may
submit a case to the Inter-American Court, and given the infrequency of the
latter, the Commission effectively controls the Court’s workload. For the
Commission to submit a case to the Court, the respondent state must be a state
party to the ACHR and the state must have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court.
In the European system, in 1998, the European Commission and the
European Court were merged into a single entity—a full-time European Court;
the European Commission was eliminated and the individual was granted direct

18 The 24 states parties to the American Convention are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and
Venezuela. The 11 countries that are not states parties to the American Convention and to which the
Inter-American Commission applies the American Declaration are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Belize, Canada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the
United States. Trinidad and Tobago acceded to the American Convention on May 28, 1991. On May
26, 1998, Trinidad and Tobago became the first country to notify its intention to denounce the
American Convention, pursuant to Article 78(1) thereof. The denunciation came into effect one year
following the date of notification. There is no reason to enter into an analysis here of the representative
government of Venezuela in the OAS.
19 See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS G.A. Res. 447, 9th Sess., art.
1 (Nature and Purposes) (1979).
20 See generally Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Approved by
the Commission at its 137th regular period of sessions, held from October 28 to November 13, 2009,
and modified on September 2nd, 2011 and during the 147th Regular Period of Sessions, held from
March 8 to 22, 2013, for entry into force on Aug. 1, 2013.), Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
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access to the Court.21 Individual victims in the inter-American system do not
have the right of direct access to the Inter-American Court, but must first go
through the procedure before the Inter-American Commission. In addition, both
the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court are part-time, not
full-time, bodies. The ACHR also requires that the Inter-American Commission
appear in all cases before the Inter-American Court.22
II. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Of the three major international human rights treaties, the UN’s ICCPR, the
Council of Europe’s ECHR, and the Organization of American States’ ACHR,
only the American Convention explicitly provides for “provisional measures.”
All three supervisory international human rights bodies, the UN Human
Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights issue “urgent,” “interim,” or “provisional”
measures and consider them legally binding, as does the Inter-American
Commission, although the latter calls them “precautionary” measures, not to
confuse them with the Inter-American Court’s “provisional” measures under
Article 63 ACHR.23 The European Court calls them “interim” measures under
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.24
Provisional measures consist of an urgent action, taken by the international
court or human rights body, to safeguard the rights of the purported victim until
the adjudicatory body has taken a final decision in the case. In the InterAmerican system, provisional measures, as part of International Human Rights
Law, have, by necessity, also taken on a second, “protective” (tutelar) function,
effectively to protect fundamental rights.25 The provisional measures are
particularly necessary when the imminent and serious situation would cause
irreparable harm to persons, such as execution, torture, or forced disappearance.

21 As mentioned, upon becoming parties to the ECHR, a state was entitled to have a national as a member
of the Commission and another as a judge on the Court. Since there are 47 member states in the Council
of Europe that would have meant 47 Commissioners and 47 judges, which was considered duplicative
and unwieldly. In the Inter-American system, there are seven Commissioners who serve as the
Commission and seven judges who serve as the Court, and they represent geographical areas, not their
states of origin.
22 See ACHR supra note 4, at art. 57.
23 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 23 U.S.T. 3277, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; LaGrand
Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J., No. 104, ¶ 22-28 (June 27); Dante Piandiong et al. v. Phil.,
Communication No. 869/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (Oct. 19, 2000).
24 Although this study is limited to the practice under the ICCPR, ACHR and ECHR, it is worth noting
that the UN Committee on Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) have included provisional measures in their Rules of Procedure. The Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) and the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances (CED) include explicit articles on
provisional measures. See e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 97, Art. 5 (entered into force Dec. 22,
2000) (“At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent consideration a
request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary to avoid possible
irreparable
damage
to
the
victim
or
victims
of
the
alleged
violation.”),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCEDAW.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
25 See Antonio A. Cançado Trindade, President of the Inter-American Court, Prologue, 2 June 2000, in
Corte I.D.H., Medidas Provisionales, Julio 1996-Junio 2000, Serie E No 2, p.x.
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Historically, the earliest requests for interim or provisional measures
involved cases where the petitioner was condemned to death and awaiting the
imminent imposition of the death penalty, which was a classic subject matter for
provisional measures both at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and before
human rights bodies. The petitioner requested the ICJ or the human rights body
to issue provisional measures requesting the state to stay the execution of the
person whose execution date had been set so that the ICJ or the human rights
body would have the time to complete its consideration of the merits of the
case.26 Were the state to execute the prisoner, the death of the person would moot
whatever eventual decision was issued. In this way, provisional measures
became a kind of reality check on the formalities of the rule of law. An eventual
decision in favor of the applicant from the ICJ or from a human rights body
would be meaningless if the beneficiary could reap no benefit from it. The
provisional measures provided an immediate response, whereas a decision on
the merits could take years.
The Inter-American Commission considered the Inter-American Court’s
“provisional measures” legally binding because they were set forth in the
ACHR, but it also considered its own “precautionary measures” legally binding,
despite the fact that they were not included in the ACHR but were created by the
Inter-American Commission, and only expressly set forth in its Rules of
Procedure, which it adopts for itself.27 This caused conflict with the InterAmerican Court, since the Court was of the view that it had a legal monopoly
on the granting of provisional measures, since only the Court is mentioned in the
ACHR in this context.28 It goes without saying, however, that if the victim had
26 See Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan v. United States, Case 12.776, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
81/11 (2011); Ramírez Cardenas & Leal García v. United States, Case 12.644, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 90/09 (2009); Javier Suarez Medina v. United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 91/05 (2005); Toronto Markkey Patterson v. United States, Case 12.439,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 25/05 (2005); Roberto Moreno Ramos v. United States, Case
12.430, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 1/05 (2005); Douglas Christopher Thomas v. United
States, Case 12.240, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 100/03 (2003); Cesar Fierro v. United
States, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 99/03 (2003); Gary Graham/Shaka Sankofa
v. United States, Case 11.193, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 97/03 (2003); Michael Domingues
v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02 (2002); Case 11.753, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/02; Juan Raul Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/01 (2001); William Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 57/96 (1996).
27 See Kevin Cooper v. United States, Case 12.831, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 78/15,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.156, doc. 31 ¶ 157 (2015) (“Kevin Cooper is the beneficiary of precautionary
measures adopted by the Inter-American Commission under Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure. The
Inter-American Commission must remind the State that carrying out a death sentence in such
circumstances would not only cause irreparable harm to the person but would also deny his right to
petition the inter-American human rights system and to obtain an effective result, and that such a
measure is contrary to the fundamental human rights obligations of an OAS member state pursuant to
the Charter of the Organization and the instruments deriving from it.”). See Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan
v. United States, Case 12.776, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/11 ¶ 66 (2011); Juan Raúl
Garza v. United States, Case No. 12.243, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/01,
OEA.Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20, rev. (2000); Annual Report of the IACHR 2000, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., ¶ 117; Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc.
21 rev. ¶ 71, 72 (2001).
28 Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade argued that the Commission should always refer requests for
provisional measures to the Court, without first using its own precautionary measures. He considered
that the latter “lack[s] conventional force.” Matter of the Persons imprisoned in the “Dr. Sebastiao
Martins Silveira” Penitentiary in Araraquara, Sao Paulo (Brazil), Order of the Court (Inter-Am. Ct.
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been executed while the case was pending before the Inter-American
Commission, then the case would have been mooted and would never have
reached the Inter-American Court.
But wait, you might say, the ACHR allows the Inter-American Commission
to request provisional measures from the Inter-American Court, even if the case
has not yet reached the Court, why doesn’t the Commission do that? Well, part
of the answer is that the Inter-American Commission was created in 1959,
twenty years before the creation of the Inter-American Court, and it alone had
been issuing precautionary measures for years and was not ready to stop doing
so. If the state failed to comply with the measures, the Inter-American
Commission began to request measures from the Court to ramp up the pressure
on the state to comply. This was a tacit recognition on the part of the
Commission that the Inter-American Court’s measures carried more weight than
its own, a generally unwise proposition for two purportedly equal bodies.29
Provisional measures are defined in Article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ): “The Court shall have the power to indicate,
if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”30 Only States
may be parties in cases before the ICJ and the Court exists, as the principal legal
organ of the United Nations, to resolve disputes between states.
III. ICJ: THE LAGRAND CASE
Historically, the ICJ’s power to order provisional measures was to preserve
the rights of the parties, the status quo ante, pending international adjudication.
The ICJ and the other international human rights bodies (the UN and
Europe) issued provisional measures but did not consider them legally binding—
until they did. The transformation began with the ICJ’s June 2001 judgment in
the famous LaGrand case (Ger. v. U.S.), a death penalty case involving two
brothers in Arizona.31 Germany presented the case on the eve of Walter
LaGrand’s execution and asked the Court to declare that the US, “in arresting,
detaining, trying, convicting and sentencing” the LaGrand brothers, violated its
“international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its right of

H.R. Sept. 30, 2006). Separate Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade. Similarly, Judge Hector FixZamudio, wrote in 1996: “Como la doctrina lo ha puesto de relieve, como esta facultad de la Comisión
no tiene su apoyo en la Convención Americana, la solicitud de medidas cautelares a los Gobiernos
involucrados no tiene carácter obligatorio, por lo que en ocasiones no es atendida de manera diligente
por los mismos Gobiernos, y por ello la Comisión, cuando las medidas que pide no se han realizado,
o lo han sido parcialmente, acude entonces ante la Corte para que esta ordene en forma imperativa las
medidas, calificadas como “provisionales” por el referido articulo 63.2 e la Convención Americana.”
Medidas provisionales: Compendio: 1987-1996, Corte I.D.H, Serie E No. 1, p. vii.
29 This may be perceived as a controversial statement by some. It should be recognized, however, that
the Commission is not required to follow the Court’s jurisprudence and routinely reiterates its
interpretations of provisions of the ACHR in litigation until the Court accepts them. The acceptance
of the Commission’s approach to “interim” measures is an appropriate example.
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 41 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
31 See LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J., No. 104, 466 (June 27) [hereinafter LaGrand].
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diplomatic protection of its nationals,” under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (VCCR).32
The first brother, Karl LaGrand, had been executed on February 24, 1999,
and the second, Walter, was to be executed on March 3, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
Germany instituted proceedings against the US accompanied by a request for
provisional measures. The ICJ granted the Order: “The United States of America
should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the
Court of all the measures which it has taken in the implementation of this
Order.”33 The wording was the same as the Order in the earlier Breard case,
involving the US imposition of the death penalty on a Paraguayan national who
allegedly had been denied his VCCR rights.34
The Order in LaGrand was issued on March 3, and Germany immediately
instituted proceedings in the US Supreme Court to enforce compliance. The US
Solicitor General took the position that “an order of the ICJ indicating
provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial
relief.”35 The US Supreme Court dismissed the motion filed by Germany, and
on the same day, Walter LaGrand was executed.
Although the Order in Breard was identical in wording to the Order in
LaGrand, the fact that Germany considered the Order binding and the US did
not, led the Court to examine the issue and, for the first time, to declare that its
provisional measures were legally binding.36
While the LaGrand case was pending before the ICJ, Mexico requested an
Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court querying whether the failure to
notify an alien of his rights under the VCCR violated his human rights. The
Inter-American Court, in its opinion dated October 1, 1999, found that the right
to seek consular assistance is “part of the body of international human rights
law,” and failure to provide such information to the alien is prejudicial to due
process. Consequently, the imposition of the death penalty constitutes an
“arbitrary” deprivation of his life.37
The public hearing on the LaGrand case took place one year and one month
later (13-17 November 2000). Germany, at the hearing, armed with the InterAmerican Court’s Advisory Opinion, no longer only argued that the US had
violated international legal obligations to Germany in its own right and in the
right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, but that the US had violated the
individual rights of the LaGrand brothers as well and had deprived them of their

32 Id. at 471.
33 Id. at 479.
34 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Para. v. U.S.), Order, 1998, I.C.J. 248 at 249, 258
(April 9).
35 LaGrand at 479.
36 Id. at ¶ 102. (“It follows from the object and purpose of this Statute, as well as from the terms of
Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such
measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the
circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined
by the final judgment of the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under Article
41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and purpose of that Article.” (emphasis
added)).
37 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Series (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 141. (Oct.
1, 1999).
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human rights.38 The ICJ agreed that the US had violated the individual rights of
the LaGrand brothers, but held that it did not have to determine whether these
rights were “human” rights.39
The interesting dissent in the LaGrand case of ICJ Vice-President Judge
Oda should be noted. Judge Oda publicly regretted having voted for the
provisional measures since they were not issued to preserve the rights of states
exposed to an imminent breach, which is irreparable: “The rights of States in
question must be those to be considered at the merits stage of the case and must
constitute the subject matter of the application instituting proceedings or be
directly related to it.”40 The provisional measures ordered by the Court to
preserve, at least temporarily, the life of Walter LaGrand, were not directly
related to the rights of states under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Judge Oda declared, and the Court made a “significant error” in
issuing the Order in this case.
Yet, even though Judge Oda declared that the Court should not have issued
the Order, and he regretted voting for it, he added that “This error was, however,
quite understandable, as a human life hung in the balance and the Court was
given very little time to decide upon the request for an order.”41 This is a good
example for my argument that the formalities of law are neglected before the
Court’s desire to do something when confronted by a human rights emergency
– the world is watching, do something to help the victim, then look at the law
later!
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Convention does not include an explicit provision granting
the European Court the power to order provisional measures; as with the InterAmerican Commission, the authority of the European Court to grant interim
measures is found in the Rules of Court.42
Historically, the European Commission and Court granted interim measures
in only serious cases, when the following circumstances were present: 1) when
the judgment of the national court would result in irreparable harm if it were
carried out (typically cases of extradition or expulsion); 2) the applicant had to
demonstrate a strong probability of a violation of a provision of the ECHR (for
example extradition to a country where the death penalty would be imposed);
and 3) the applicant did not have access at the national level to a domestic
remedy that would suspend the action (if such a remedy existed then the
principle of subsidiarity would impede the European Court from acting).43

38 Id. at 32.
39 Id. at 52.
40 Id. at 70. (Oda, J., dissenting).
41 Id.
42 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rules of Court. Rule 39(1) provides: “1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, the
President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the
request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any
interim measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper
conduct of the proceedings.”
43 Eudes, M., LA PRATIQUE JUDICIAIRE INTERNE DE LA COUR EUROPÉENE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME,
(Ed. A. Pedone, Paris, 2005) at 137 et seq.
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Following the ICJ decision in the LaGrand case, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights, in the 2005 Mamatkulov v. Turkey judgment,
surveyed the provisional measures practice of the ICJ and the major human
rights bodies and followed them. The Grand Chamber declared that its own
“interim” measures were legally binding, overturning the European system’s
earlier jurisprudence established in the Cruz Varas and Others case.44 The case
concerned two Uzbek nationals who faced extradition from Turkey to
Uzbekistan where they were charged with various crimes including the
attempted assassination of the president of the Republic. Despite the issuance
of the interim measures, the two men were sent back to Uzbekistan and the
Grand Chamber found no violation of the substantive rights to torture or fair
trial.
The European Court reviewed the practice of the UN Human Rights
Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, the International Court of
Justice, the provisions of the ACHR, the practice of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission, and
the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights and determined
that Turkey’s extradition of the purported victims, in disregard of the European
Court’s provisional measures, “rendered nugatory the applicants’ right to
individual application,” a procedural right, under Article 34 of the ECHR.45
Curiously, however, the European Court emphasized that the European
Commission, which had issued the Cruz Varas decision (that was being
overturned), “was not empowered to issue a binding decision,” even though the
European Commission was no longer in existence. Were the European
Commission still functioning in 2003, and were the purported victims extradited
despite interim measures issued by the European Commission instead of the
European Court, the right of individual application also would apparently have
been violated.
In the European system, the object and purpose of interim measures “is to
preserve and protect the interests of the parties to the dispute pending the Court’s
determination of the compatibility of the impugned decision with the
Convention,” or in other words, to preserve the status quo.46 Interim measures
in the European system are granted to enjoin the state from taking action, such
as to stay the removal of a failed asylum seeker back to the country of origin,
and to request the state to take action, such as to provide urgent or emergency
medical treatment to persons in custody.
In 2010, the European Court granted more than 1,443 requests (mainly
regarding expulsions to Iraq and Somalia) out of 3,775 requests.47 Concerned
that the European Court was becoming a fourth instance appeal body against
national immigration tribunals, the President of the Court issued a Practice

44 Mamatkulov v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.App. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, First Section, Judgment 6
February 2003. ECtHR - Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Application Nos. 46827/99 and
46951/99, 4 February 2005. The Cruz Varas and Others case was decided by the European
Commission of Human Rights, no longer in existence in 2003.
45 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey supra note 44, at 32.
46 David Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, (3d ed. Oxford University
Press, 2014) p. 138, 139.
47 Id. at 139.
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Statement to ensure that remedies existed under national law and to reduce the
number of requests for interim measures coming to the Court.48
V. UNLINKING PROVISIONAL MEASURES FROM A PENDING CASE
A. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURES
The Inter-American Commission derives its authority to issue precautionary
measures from Article 106 of the OAS Charter, which states that the
Commission is “to promote the observance and protection of human rights.”49
Article 25 of the Commission’s current Rules of Procedure provides that, in
serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at
the request of a party, request that a State adopt precautionary measures. Such
measures, whether related to a petition or not, shall concern serious and urgent
situations presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to subject matter of
a pending petition or case before the organs of the Inter-American system
(emphasis added). The measures may be of a collective nature to prevent
irreparable harm to persons due to their association with an organization, a
group, or a community with identified or identifiable members.50 The
Commission’s authority to request precautionary measures extends to all OAS
member States, unlike the provisional measures of the Court.
In one of the earliest examples of a case involving precautionary measures,
the existence of a case was crucial. In 1988, in the case of Jorge Blanco, the
former President of the Dominican Republic was denied the precautionary
measures he requested to protect him from an in-absentia trial when he
voluntarily appeared before a Dominican court to file his appeal, which proved
that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. The Commission noted in its
decision that: “[T]he decision to take preventive measures could not be adopted
without reference to the substance [fondo] of the complaint, and this would be
premature while the case is in progress before the competent judicial authorities
of the Dominican Republic.”51
Beginning in 1996, the Inter-American Commission began to record in its
Annual Report the precautionary measures it had requested of States during the

48 Id.
49 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A, OEA/Ser. A/2(SEPF)Add., by the
Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66, OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the
Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol
of Managua, June 10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the integrated text reflecting all
four amendments available at http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A41_charter_OAS.asp#Chapter_XV (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). [hereinafter OAS Charter]. See InterAm. Comm’n H.R. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc 69 Ch. III (c)(1) (2011),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/TOC.asp. (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
50
Precautionary
Measures,
Inter-American
Commission
on
Human
Rights,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
51 Blanco v. Dominican Republic, Case 10.208, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 15/89,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76,
doc.
10
¶17
(1989),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/88.89eng/Dom.Rep.10.208.htm. (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
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year.52 Given the frustration with the delays in the adjudication of cases, urgent
actions known as precautionary-provisional measures became ever more
necessary to prevent serious and imminent danger of irreparable harm to
persons. Although many of the early precautionary measures, such as the case
of Jorge Blanco, were connected to a case, the Inter-American Commission
asserted that it was free to take any action it considered necessary for the
discharge of its functions either at its own initiative or at the request of a party.53
In its Annual Reports the Commission stated: “[I]n serious and urgent cases, and
whenever necessary, according to the information available, the Commission
may, on its own initiative or upon request by a party, request that the State
concerned adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to
persons.”54
As mentioned earlier, the Inter-American system has interpreted the
issuance of interim measures as having a dual function: to preserve the subject
matter of the case (e.g. to stay the execution of a person condemned to death
until the case has been decided) and to protect (tutelar) the fundamental rights
of persons in urgent and imminent danger of irreparable harm. From the earliest
precautionary measures issued, the Commission has taken the view that the
protection of persons in danger of irreparable harm does not require the existence
of, or connection to, a pending case, and the measures have been used to protect
human rights defenders, witnesses, or other persons under threat.
In 2001, the Commission’s amended Rules of Procedure entered into force
and purportedly clarified “the rules governing precautionary measures . . . in
light of current practices.”55 This clarification stated that precautionary measures
would be issued in serious and urgent cases, whenever necessary, on the
Commission’s own initiative or upon request by a party, to prevent irreparable
harm to persons.56 Since the criteria of seriousness, urgency, and irreparable
harm did not explicitly refer to the existence of a pending case or petition, the

52

Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
AG/RES.
1404
(XXVI-0/96)
(1996),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/chap.2.htm. (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
53 The Commission derives this authority to take whatever action is required from Article 41 ACHR,
which provides: “The main functions of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense
of human rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers: b) to
make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it considers such action
advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of
their domestic law and constitution provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the
observance of those rights; d) to request the governments of the members states to supply it with
information on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights; and f) to take action on
petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the provisions of Articles 44
through 51 of this Convention.”
54 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 doc. 5 rev. Ch. III(c)(1) (2001),
https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2001eng/chap.3a.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
55 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. Ch. II ¶26 (2001),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.2.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
56 Article 25(1) of the 2000 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission provided: “In serious
and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission
may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt
precautionary
measures
to
prevent
irreparable
harm
to
persons,”
https://www.oas.org/xxxvga/english/doc_referencia/Reglamento_CIDH.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
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Commission considered itself competent to issue protective measures without
an accompanying case.57
What began to happen is that more and more precautionary measures were
issued for individuals independent of a case and independent of its original
function of preserving the subject matter of a case until it had a chance to review
the merits. The “protective” mechanism became a kind of fire brigade,
attempting to resolve all crises by extinguishing the fires; the rationale being that
it was “saving lives.”
As the Inter-American Commission was issuing precautionary measures
outside the context of a case, in 2009 it became necessary for the Commission
to revise its Rules of Procedure and to explicitly state that in serious and urgent
situations, the Commission may request that a state adopt precautionary
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons in connection with a pending
case or independent of a petition or case (emphasis added).58
In the Commission’s 2011 Annual Report, due to general confusion among
the OAS member states about its precautionary measures, the Commission set
forth a detailed explanation of the system of precautionary measures and the
provisions of its 2009 Rules of Procedure.59
In 2013, the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission were
revised again on March 18, 2013 in Resolution 1/2013, which entered into force
on August 1, 2013.60 Since then, the synopsis on the precautionary measures
granted is linked to the actual text of the Commission’s resolution, which is
published on the Commission’s website.61 These resolutions explicitly set forth

57 In both the English and Spanish versions of Article 63(2) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, the term “matter” or “asunto” is used instead of “case,” leading to this interpretation. (“In cases
of extreme gravity and urgency, and where necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court
shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration.” But,
of course, Article 63(2) goes on to say, “With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may
act at the request of the Commission.” It appears to this observer that the system only provides for the
Commission to present “cases” before the Court and not ad hoc requests for measures untethered from
cases, and that the second part of Article 63(2) makes that clear. ACHR supra note 4, at art. 63(2).
58 Article 25(2) of the 2009 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission provided: “2. In
serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party,
request that a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons under the
jurisdiction of the State concerned, independently of any pending petition or case.”
https://www.oas.org/36ag/english/doc_referencia/Reglamento_CorteIDH.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
59 “The system of precautionary measures has been a feature of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure
for over 30 years. The most recent amendment of the Rules of Procedure took effect on December 31,
2009. Article 25 describes the procedure for precautionary measures and how a precautionary measure
may be related to the subject matter of a petition or case (Article 25.1); the adoption of precautionary
measures independently of any pending petition or case (Article 25.2); the individual or collective
nature of precautionary measures (Article 25.3); the fact that the IACHR is to request relevant
information from the state concerned, unless the urgency of the situation is such that the immediate
granting of the measures is warranted (Article 25.5); the procedures for seeking withdrawal of the
request for precautionary measures and the grounds for the Commission to withdraw its request for
precautionary measures (articles 25.7 and 25.8), and other points. In the amendment process, the
Commission gave extensive consideration to the comments and criticisms submitted by many OAS
member states, civil society organizations, academics and private citizens from across the hemisphere,
in response to the consultations instituted concerning the text of the preliminary draft amendment.” Id.
60 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/Resolution1-2013eng.pdf. (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
61
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
Resolution
44/20,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp. (last visited Dec 1, 2020).
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the rationale for the granting or denial of the measures and facilitated the
determination of whether the measures were connected to a case or not.
In practice, the protective function is exercised in order to avoid irreparable
harm to the life and personal integrity of the beneficiary as a subject of the
international law of human rights. Precautionary measures have, therefore, been
ordered for a wide array of situations unrelated to any case pending with the
Inter-American human rights system.62
During the past eight years (2012-2019), the Inter-American Commission
received 6,902 requests for precautionary measures and granted 420 or 6.7%.63
In the past four years (2016-2019) the requests have doubled what they were in
the earlier four years (2012-2015). In 2016, there were 1061 requests, in 2017,
1037 requests, in 2018, 1618 requests and in 2019, 1160 requests. Many
precautionary measures have been granted for persons on death row,64
unidentified but identifiable groups of persons,65 and persons who have suffered
reprisals for their protest activities.66
Precautionary measures, for example, have been granted to individuals in
the following situations, usually without a petition or a case having been filed
together with the request for precautionary measures:

62

The beneficiaries cited in the 2011 Annual Report are: “Afro-descendant communities, indigenous
peoples, displaced persons, LGTBI communities and persons deprived of their liberty. They have also
been used to protect witnesses, officers of the court, persons about to be deported to a country where
they might be subjected to torture or other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, persons sentenced
to the death penalty, and others. The IACHR has also ordered precautionary measures to protect the
right to health and the right of the family. It has also resorted to precautionary measures in situations
involving the environment, where the life or health of persons or the way of life of indigenous peoples
in their ancestral territory may be imperiled, and in other situations.” Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. supra,
note 49.
63
See
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
Multimedia
Statistics,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
64 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 77/18, PM 82/18 - Ramiro Ibarra Rubi, United States; Resolution
41/17 PM 736-17 - Rubén Ramírez Cárdenas, United States; Resolution 21/17 PM 250/17 - Lezmond
Mitchell, United States; Resolution 14/17 PM 241/17 and 304/15 - Víctor Hugo Saldaño, United
States; Resolution 9/17 PM 156/17 – William Charles Morva, United States; PM 489/15 - Alfredo
Rolando Prieto, United States; PM 304/15 – José Trinidad Loza Ventura, United States; PM 37/14 Samuel Moreland, United States; PM 204/14 - John Winfield, United States; PM 83/14 - Keron López
and Garvin Sookram, Trinidad and Tobago; PM 110/14 - Matter of Ramiro Hernández Llanas, United
States; PM 57/14 - Pete Carl Rogovich, United States; PM 255/13 - Robert Gene Garza, United States,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
65 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 57/19, PM 887/19 - Families of the Nueva Austria del Sira
Community, Peru; Resolution 47/19 PM 458/19 - Guyraroká community of the Guarani Kaiowá
Indigenous People, Brazil; Resolution 7/19 PM 181/19 – Indigenous persons of the Pemon ethnic
group in the San Francisco de Yuruaní or “Kumaracapay” community and one other, Venezuela;
Resolution 24/19 PM 1498/18 - Marcelino Díaz Sánchez and others, Mexico; Resolution 36/17 PM
412-17 Residents displaced and the displacement of the Laguna Larga Community, Guatemala; PM
505/15 - Members of the communities “Esperanza, Santa Clara, Wisconsin y Francia Sirpi” in the
territory of the Miskitu indigenous people; PM 277/13 – Members of the Otomí-Mexica Indigenous
Community of San Francisco Xochicuautla, Mexico; PM 54/13 – Matter of communities in voluntary
isolation of the Ayoreo Totobiegosode People, Paraguay; PM 321/12 - Teribe and Bribri of Salitre
Indigenous People, Costa Rica, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited
Dec. 1, 2020).
66 PM 1045-19 - Bayron José Corea Estrada and his family, Nicaragua; Resolution 17/19 PM 250/19 Luis Carlos Díaz and his family, Venezuela; PM 106/15 - Cruz Sánchez Lagarda and others, México.
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Statistics supra note 63.
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• journalists at risk or subject to death threats;67
• an individual and his family kidnapped by an armed group
drug involved in drug trafficking;68
• threats against a human rights defender;69
• persons with disabilities subject to electroshocks;70
• death threats or harassment based on sexual orientation;71
• life or personal integrity at risk in detention or prison;72

67 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 91/18 PM 1606/18 – Carlos Fernando Chamorro Barrios and
others, Nicaragua; Resolution 19/19 PM 1025/18 - Manuel Alejandro León Velázquez, Cuba;
Resolution 90/18 PM 873/18 – Miguel Mora Barberena, Leticia Gaitán Hernández and their families,
Nicaragua; Resolution 96/18, PM 698/18 – Álvaro Lucio Montalván and his family, Nicaragua;
Resolution 43/17 PM 678-17 - Journalists of Factum Magazine, El Salvador; PM 573/15 – X et al.,
Mexico;
PM
458/14
–
Members
of
Kaieteur
News
Journal,
Guyana,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
68
Resolution
95/18
PM
1375/18,
Daniel
Ramírez
Contreras,
Mexico,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
69 Resolution 89/18, PM 1358/18 - Joana D'Arc Mendes, Brazil; Resolution 20/17 PM 402/17 - Jair
Krischke, Uruguay; Resolution 33/17 PM 331/17 - Francisca Ramírez and Family Members,
Nicaragua; PM 705/16 - Esteban Hermelindo Cux Choc and his family, Guatemala; PM 658/16 Erlendy Cuero Bravo and her family, Colombia; PM 468/16 - Daniel Pascual and his family,
Guatemala; PM 359/16 – Américo de Grazia, Venezuela; Resolution 47/17 PM 261-16- Daniel Ernesto
Prado Albarracin, Colombia; PM 236/16 – Juana Mora Cedeño et al., Cuba; PM 438/15 – Marino
Alvarado, Venezuela; PM 416/15 – Members of the Ensemble des Citoyens Compétents a la
Recherche l´Egalité des Droits de l´Homme, Haiti; PM 275/15 – Juders Ysemé and others, Haiti; PM
96/15 - Members of Cubalex, Cuba; PM 77/15 - Defenders E. and K. and their relatives, Mexico; PM
65/15 - Martha Ligia Arnold Dubond and her 5 children, Honduras; Resolution 5/17 PM 522/14 Alberto Yepes Palacio and his Daughter, Colombia; PM 253/14 - Héctor Orlando Martínez and Family,
Honduras; PM 336/14 - Gener Jhonathan Echeverry Ceballos and family, Colombia; PM 218/14 Y.C.G.M and her Immediate Family, Colombia; PM 161/14 - Pierre Espérance and Members of the
Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), Haiti; PM 408/13 - Members of the
Movimiento “Reconocido,” Dominican Republic. PM 382/12 – Members of the Community Action
Board of the Village of Rubiales, Colombia, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp
(last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
70 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 86/18, PM 1357/18, Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, United
States of America, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
71 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 85/18, PM 1262/18, Jean Wyllys de Matos Santos and his family,
Brazil. PM 457/13, Members of “Asociación para una Vida Mejor de Honduras” [Association for a
better life in Honduras] (APUVIMEH), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2020).
72 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 40/19, PM 379/19, Penitenciaría Evaristo de Moraes, Brasil;
Resolution 53/19, PM 289/19, Héctor Armando Hernández Da Costa, Venezuela; Resolution 23/19
PM 81/19, Edilberto Ronal Arzuaga Alcalá, Cuba; Resolution 84/18, PM 1133/18, Amaya Eva
Coppens Zamora and others (Deprived of their Liberty at the Penitentiary Center "La Esperanza");
Resolution 48/17, PM 519/17, Eduardo Valencia Castellanos, Mexico; Resolution 50/17 PM 383/17,
Santiago José Guevara, Venezuela; Resolution 25/17 PM 184/17, Mohammad Rahim, United States;
Resolution 44/17, PM 1098/16, Juan José Barrientos Soto Vargas, Chile; Resolution 67/16, PM
750/16, Braulio Jatar, Venezuela; Resolution 23/17, PM 25/16, Milagro Sala, Argentina; Resolution
45/17, PM 600/15, Angel Omar Vivas Perdomo, Venezuela; Resolution 25/17, PM 46/15, Moath alAlwi, United States; Resolution 4/15, PM 535/14, Persons in Immigration Detention at Carmichael
Road Detention Center, The Bahamas; Resolution 24/15, PM 422/14, Matter of Mustafa Adam AlHawsawi, United States of America; Resolution, 12/15, PM 335/14, Leopoldo Lopez and Daniel
Ceballos, Venezuela; Resolution 24/14, PM 307/14, Matter of Julio César Cano Molina, Cuba; PM
35/14, Almafuerte and San Felipe Prison Complexes, Argentina; Resolution 2/15, PM 455/13, Nestora
Salgado Garcia, Mexico; PM 223/13, Lorent Saleh and Gerardo Carrero, Venezuela; Resolution,
27/14, PM 442/12, William Alberto Pérez Jerez, El Salvador; Resolution 3/15, PM 363/11, José Ángel
Parra Bernal, Colombia, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
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•
•
•
•
•

inadequate medical care and treatment;73
residents of a community subject to environmental toxins;74
threats against an environmental rights defender;75
harassment of political opposition leaders;76
deportation to country of origin of someone with a serious
illness;77
• political opposition leader in incommunicado detention;78
• ostensible forced disappearance;79
• members of the military detained and mistreated in military
installations;80

73 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 13/19, PM 150/19, Concepción Palacios Maternity Hospital,
Venezuela; Resolution 48/19 PM, 451/19 - M.A.V.G., Colombia; Resolution 18/19, PM 1286-18,
1287-18, 1288-18 and 1289-18, Inírida Josefina Ramos López, Sara María Olmos Reverón, Miguel
Eduardo Perozo González and Carmen Alicia Márquez de D'Jesus, Venezuela; Resolution 83/18, PM
283/18, T.S.G.T., Colombia; Resolution 37/17, PM 309/17, Johonnys Armando Hernández,
Venezuela; Resolution 44/20, PM 747/16, Luis, Colombia; Resolution 28/17, PM 440/16, Zaheer
Seepersad, Trinidad and Tobago; Resolution 28/18, PM 617/15, Gomez Murillo and others, Costa
Rica; Resolution 44/20, PM 376/15, Irene, Argentina; Resolution 42/15, PM 445/14, Jessica Liliana
Ramírez Gaviria, Colombia; Resolution 44/20, PM 215/15, Alejandro and others, Mexico,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
74 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 52/17, PM 120-16 Residents of the Community of Cuninico et
al., Peru; Resolution 38/17 PM, 113/16, “Tres Islas” Native Community of Madre de Dios, Peru,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited July 29, 2020).
75 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 82/18, PM 1165/18, Sergio López Cantera, Mexico; PM 112/16
– Members of COPINH, Berta Cáceres’ relatives and other, Honduras; PM 589/15, Ana Miran Romero
and Others, Honduras, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
76 Resolution 58/19, PM 938/19, Paola Pabón and others, Ecuador; Resolution 22/19 PM 125/19, María
Corina Machado Parisca, Venezuela; Resolution 1/19 PM 70/19, Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez and
his family, Venezuela; Resolution 21/19, PM 566/18, Jennifer Brown Bracket and George Henríquez
Cayasso, Nicaragua; Resolution 35/17, PM 533/17, Williams Dávila, Venezuela; Resolution 27/17 PM
449/17, Luisa Ortega Díaz and Family, Venezuela; Resolution 15/17, PM 248/17, Henrique Capriles
Radonski, Venezuela; Resolution 12/17, PM 616/16, Luis Florido, Venezuela; Resolution 1/17, PM
475/15, Members of the Voluntad Popular Political Party, Venezuela; PM 121/16, Carlos Humberto
Bonilla Alfaro and others, Nicaragua, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2020).
77 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 81/18, PM 490/18, M.B.B.P., Panama; PM 347/13, Carl E.
Vincent, United States of America, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2020).
78 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 79/18, PM 1039/18, Juan Carlos Requesens Martínez, Venezuela;
Resolution
24/17,
PM
403/17,
Julio
Borges
et
al.,
Venezuela,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
79 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 54/19, PM 918/19, Hugo Enrique Marino Salas, Venezuela;
Resolution 51/19, PM 870/19, Aaron Casimiro Méndez Ruíz y Alfredo Castillo, México; Resolution
26/19, PM 426/19, Gilbert Alexander Caro Alfonzo, Venezuela; Resolution 12/19, PM 265/19, Carla
Valpeoz, Peru; Resolution 32/17, PM 564/17, Santiago Maldonado, Argentina; Resolution 31/17, PM
209/17, Francisco Javier Barraza Gómez, Mexico; Resolution 30/17, PM 178/17, Julio César Vélez
Restrepo et al., Colombia; PM 29/16, Margarita Marín Yan and others, Mexico; PM 5/15, José
Moisés Sánchez Cerezo, Mexico; PM 455/14, Duban Celiano Cristancho Diaz, Colombia; PM 453/13,
Daniel Ramos Alfaro, Mexico, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited
Dec. 1, 2020).
80 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Resolution 3/19 PM 115/19, Oswaldo García Palomo and others, Venezuela;
Resolution 10/19, PM 102/19, Luis Alejandro Mogollón Velásquez, Venezuela; Resolution 8/19, PM
83/19, Luis Alexander Bandres Figueroa, Venezuela; Resolution 9/19, PM 1302/18, Isbert José Marín
Chaparro, Venezuela, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
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• at risk of deportation to country of origin (nonrefoulment).81
This is not an exhaustive list. Precautionary measures have been granted for
other reasons as well, as a review of the Inter-American Commission’s website
on precautionary measures will reveal.82 The Commission’s activity regarding
precautionary measures spans granting measures, expanding them and lifting
them. The relevant point here is that most of the precautionary measures granted
by the Inter-American Commission today are granted independent of a case.
Consequently, when the Commission grants measures in the context of a case,
it has become unique enough for it to point out that a case also has been
presented.83
B. INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS—PROVISIONAL MEASURES
As mentioned earlier, of the three major international human rights treaties,
only the American Convention specifically includes a provision on the granting
of provisional measures: Article 63(2) ACHR provides: “In cases of extreme
gravity and urgency, and where necessary to avoid irreparable damage to
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent
in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to
the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission.”84 Unlike the
Commission’s “precautionary” measures which may be adopted with regard to
all OAS member states, the Court’s “provisional” measures may only be adopted
with regard to the States party to the ACHR that also have recognized the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. In addition, the granting
of the Inter-American Court’s provisional measures normally requires an
adversarial public hearing, similar to the public hearing before the ICJ, whereas
such a hearing is not required for the issuance of the Commission’s
precautionary measures.
The Inter-American Court, for its part, has issued a maximum of twentytwo orders for provisional measures per year in the recent period 2015-2019. For
the purposes of this study it is useful to look at how the Inter-American Court’s
practice has evolved.
In June 1996, Hector Fix Zamudio wrote a preface to the first compilation
of provisional measures ordered by the Inter-American Court during the period
1987-1996 from which he derived three principles: (1) the provisional measures
that the Commission seeks in matters that have not yet been introduced before

81 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. PM 297/16, E.G.S. and A.E.S.G., United States of America; PM 152/16,
D.S., United States of America; PM 141/14, Manuel Escalona Sánchez, Wilfredo Matos Gutiérrez,
and
Ortelio
Abrahante
Bacallao,
the
Bahamas,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
82
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
Precautionary
Measures,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
83 For example, the precautionary measures granted in the death penalty case for Samuel Moreland (PM
37/14 - Samuel Moreland, United States of America) were granted within the context of case P610/14.
Similarly, the precautionary measures granted in the case of Fernando Villavicencio (PM 30/14 Fernando Alcibíades Villavicencio Valencia et al., Ecuador) were granted in the context of case
P107/14.
84 ACHR supra note 4 at art. 63(2).

2021

PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

52

the Court should be considered “extraordinary”; (2) in urgent cases, when it is
necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Commission can request
precautionary measures in order to avoid the consummation of the irreparable
damage, when the facts denounced are true; (3) when the Commission seeks
precautionary measures, it must present information to the Tribunal that, prima
facie, permits it to adopt such measures, which require that the Commission has
gathered, albeit in a preliminary manner, the elements which let it presume the
truth of the denounced facts and the existence of a situation of extreme gravity
and urgency that can cause irreparable harm to persons.85
In 1993, in one of the earliest provisional measures granted, the InterAmerican Court noted that Case 10.959 had not (yet) been presented but that the
physical integrity of two minors was in question and that: “[d]espite the fact that
the Commission had not yet submitted the case to the Court, the mental integrity
of the two minors is at stake and it is important to prevent them from suffering
irreparable damage as a result of the situation alleged in the request for
provisional measures. This situation is characterized by the gravity and urgency
necessary for the request to be acted upon.”86
It is clear that the Inter-American Court, given the precise language of
Article 63(2), presumed that matters brought to the Court for provisional
measures by the Inter-American Commission, involved cases pending before the
Commission that had not yet been brought to the Court.87 Judge Antonio
Cançado Trindade, in an article published in 1998, noted that the Court has
ordered provisional measures “both to cases pending before it and, upon the
request of the Commission, with respect to cases before the Commission which
have not yet been submitted to it.”88 With regard to the latter he noted: “In such
instances of requests by the Commission in cases not pending before the Court,
the Court applied a presumption that such measures of protection are
necessary.”89
Hector Faundez, an astute commentator, already in the 1999 version of his
book, noticed that the Commission had explicitly requested precautionary
measures in 1997, despite not having opened these cases:90
“Although the precautionary measures suppose a legal
procedure is underway, on some occasions the Commission
has expressly indicated that such measures were adopted
“without opening [the] case,” a practice which certainly is at
odds with the Convention, which in none of its provisions
85 Hector Fix-Zamudio, President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Prolog, in Corte I.D.H.,
Medidias Provisionales- Compendio: 1987-1996, Serie E No 1, p. ix.
86 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Resolution of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Order
of 19 November 1993. Provisional Measures requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights relating to Argentina. (Case of Reggiardo Toloso). See also, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Annual Report
1993, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_1993.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
87 It is not clear to me whether all the judges on the Court were aware that the Commission was bringing
“matters” to the attention of the Court that were not linked to cases. It appears that Judge Fix-Zamudio
was probably aware of the Commission’s practice but that Judge Cançado Trindade was not.
88 ANTONIO CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE OPERATION OF THE COURT, 1979-1996 IN HARRIS &
LIVINGSTONE at 145 (Clarendon Press, 1998).
89 Id. at 146.
90 Faundez Ledesma, H., El Sistema Interamericano de protección de los Derechos Humanos, Aspectos
Institucionales y Procesales, at 274, 2 ed. (IIDH, 1999). Free translation from the original.
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permits the Commission to decide whether to open or not a
case that is submitted to it. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out,
that after receiving a petition and adopting precautionary
measures, the Commission decides that said petition is
inadmissible.”91
In 2001, in the “La Nacion” newspaper case, the Inter-American Court
distinguished the two functions of provisional measures: the preventive function
and the protective function. The language of these provisions has been reiterated
by the Court innumerable times.92
2. That Article 63(2) of the Convention establishes that:
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary
to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt
such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it
has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet
submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the
Commission.
3. That, in this regard, Article 25(1) of the Rules of Procedure
of the Court stipulates that:
At any stage of the proceedings involving cases of extreme
gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable
damage to persons, the Court may, at the request of a party or
on its own motion, order such provisional measures as it deems
pertinent, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Convention.
4. That, in international human rights law, the nature of
provisional measures is not only preventive in the sense that
they preserve a juridical situation, but fundamentally
protective, because they protect human rights. Provided the
basic requirements of extreme gravity and urgency and the
prevention of irreparable damage to persons are met,
provisional measures become a genuine jurisdictional
guarantee of a preventive nature.93
In 2004, the Inter-American Court elaborated on the distinction between the
preventive and protective nature of provisional measures:
6. That, in general, under domestic legal systems (internal
procedural law), the purpose of provisional measures is to
protect the rights of the parties in dispute, ensuring that the

91 The references are to the cases of Ana Maria Lopez, or Leonor La Rosa Bustamante, both against Peru,
in the Commission’s 1997 Annual Report Ms. Lopez was dying of cancer, and the Commission opened
a case after requesting the measures, and she was pardoned. The Commission also opened the case of
Ms. La Rosa Bustamante after requesting the measures, but she had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies.
92 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court of June 18, 2002, Provisional Measures requested by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights with respect to Colombia, Case of the Peace Community of
San Jose de Apartadó, “considering” ¶2-4.
93 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court of December 6, 2001, Provisional Measures in the Matter of
the Republic of Costa Rica, the La Nación Newspaper case.
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judgment on merits is not prejudiced by their actions pendente
lite.
7. That, under international human rights law, the purpose of
urgent and provisional measures goes further because, in
addition to their essentially preventive nature, they protect
fundamental rights, since they seek to avoid irreparable
damage to persons.94
That in International Human Rights Law, urgent and
provisional measures are not only of a precautionary nature, in
the sense that they preserve a legal situation, but also, and
mainly, of a protective nature, in the sense that they safeguard
human rights, to the extent that they seek to avoid irreparable
damage to persons. Provided the basic requirements of
extreme gravity and urgency and prevention of irreparable
damage to persons are met, urgent and provisional measures
become a true judicial guarantee of a preventive nature.95
On February 2, 2006, the Court issued an Order concerning a request for
provisional measures presented by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, in which it decided not to process the request until a petition had been
lodged with the Commission.96
Under Article 27 of the 2009 Court’s Rules of Procedure, provisional
measures could be issued by the Court, ex officio, on its own initiative, or with
respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, at the request of the InterAmerican Commission, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the ACHR, or at the request
of the representatives of the purported victim, once the case has been presented
to the Court. The Court very rarely issued provisional measures ex officio.97 In
the case of provisional measures, Article 27 indicated that when such measures
are requested within the framework of a contentious case before the Court, they
must be related to the purpose of the case. There was no indication in the 2009
Rules that provisional measures could be granted if there were no case or petition
presented to the Commission or Court, despite the fact that the 2009 Rules of
Procedure of the Commission expressly stated that the Commission could
request that a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to
persons in connection with a pending case or independent of a petition or case.98
94 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court of August 30, 2004 Provisional Measures regarding Guatemala
Case of Raxcacó et al.
95 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court of February 2, 2006 Provisional Measures regarding the
Dominican Republic. Matter of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian-Origin in the Dominican
Republic.
96 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of February 2, 2006, Request for Provisional Measures submitted by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding the United Mexican States, Matter of GarciaUribe
et
al.,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/corteidh/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_medidas_provisionales.cfm?lang=en
(last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
97 Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade mentioned five cases. See Prologue of Antonio Cançado Trindade,
President of the Inter-American Court, 28 August 2001, in Corte I.D.H., Medidas Provisionales, Julio
2000–Junio 2001, Series E, No. 3, ¶19, p. xiii.
98 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Resolution of November 17, 2009, Provisional Measures relating to
Venezuela, In the matter of Guerrero Larez, “considering” ¶6-8; Resolution of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights of September 21, 2009, Provisional Measures relating to Haiti, in the matter
of A.J. and Others, “considering” ¶5.
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In 2012, the Inter-American Court still linked the granting of provisional
measures to the existence of a contentious case that had been submitted to it, or
one that was pending submission by the Commission. However, the Court’s
2012 Annual Report stated that the Commission could submit a request for
provisional measures, “even if the case had not been submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Court,” clearly assuming that a case existed:
The provisional measures can be requested by the InterAmerican Commission at any time, even if the case has not
been submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, and by the
representatives of the alleged victims, provided they relate to
a case that the Court is examining. The Court may also issue
such measures ex officio.
Despite the above, however, in granting provisional measures in the case of
Wong Ho Wing, the Court referred to “matters not yet submitted to its
consideration, at the request of the Commission” rather than “a case not yet
submitted to its consideration”:
Article 63(2) of the American Convention stipulates that in
“cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to
avoid irreparable damage to persons,” the Court may, in
matters not yet submitted to its consideration, at the request of
the Commission, order the provisional measures that it deems
pertinent. This provision is, in turn, regulated in Article 27 of
the Court’s Rules of Procedure.99
In 2013, when the Commission’s Rules of Procedure explicitly indicated
that the Commission could adopt precautionary measures whether the request
was related to a petition or not, the Commission had limited its analysis to the
seriousness, urgency and danger of irreparable harm to the victim.
In 2013, the Inter-American Court received a request for provisional
measures from the Commission regarding a young woman whose continued
pregnancy seriously endangered her life in a country where abortion was
prohibited by law and punishable by prison.100 The request for provisional
measures was not part of a case presented to the Inter-American Court, nor was
a petition presented to the Inter-American Commission substantiating the merits
of the case in the request for provisional measures. The Court, however, justified
its action and established a new test, by noting that pursuant to the protective
character of provisional measures, it was possible for the Court to grant them,
on an exceptional basis, even when there was no contentious case before the
Inter-American system, in situations where, prima facie, there would be serious,
imminent and irreparable harm to human rights.101

99 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of June 26, 2012 Provisional Measures with regard to the Republic of Peru,
Matter of Wong Ho Wing, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/wong_se_08_ing.pdf (last visited
Dec. 1, 2020).
100 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Resolution of May 29, 2013, Provisional Measures relating to El Salvador, In the
Matter of B.
101 Id. “considering” ¶4.
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In this context, the Inter-American Court indicated that it must take into
account the requirements established in Article 63 of the American Convention,
the problem at issue, the efficacy of the State’s actions regarding the situation
described and the seriousness of the lack of protection in which the potential
beneficiaries of the measures find themselves if they are not adopted.102
The Court reiterated that in such cases, the Inter-American Commission
must present a rationale that adequately addresses the above-mentioned criteria
and that the State does not demonstrate in a clear and sufficient manner the
efficacy of the measures that have been adopted at the national level.103
In distinguishing again between preventive and protective measures, the
Court noted that in the International Law of Human Rights, when the basic
requisites are complied with, they are transformed into an authentic
jurisdictional guarantee of preventive character because they protect human
rights in so far as they avoid irreparable damage to persons.104
The three conditions required by Article 63(2) of the American Convention
in order to enable the granting of all provisional measures are: extreme
seriousness, urgency and necessity of avoiding irreparable harm to persons. No
other fact is relevant since any other fact or argument could be analyzed and
resolved during the consideration of the merits in a contentious case.105
Since 2013, the Inter-American Court has routinely granted provisional
measures that were not based on a petition before the Commission or a case
presented to the Court.106 In this delinking of the provisional measures from the
102 In an earlier 2009 Resolution involving conditions in prisons and detention centers in Venezuela, the
Inter-American Court stated that in granting “provisional measures the Court, in principle, does not
require proof of the facts that prima facie appeared to comply with the requisites of Article 63.” This
sentence was not repeated in later reiterations of the requirements for issuing provisional measures.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 24, 2009,
Provisional Measures relating to Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in the matter of Internado Judicial
de Monagas (“La Pica”); Centro Penitenciario Región Capital Yare I y Yare II (Cárcel de Yare); Centro
Penitenciario de la Región Centro Occidental (Cárcel de Uribana), and Internado Judicial Capital El
Rodeo I y el Rodeo II, “considering” ¶4.
103 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Resolution of May 29, 2013, supra note 100, “considering” ¶4.
104 Id. ¶5.
105 Id. ¶6.
106 Asunto Integrantes Del Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH) y de la Comisíon
Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH), Provisional Measures, Resolución del Presidente de la
Corte, “considering” ¶ 6 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2019),
https://www.refworld.org.es/pdfid/5d434e074.pdf. See also Asunto Integrantes de la Comunidad
Indígena de Choréachi , Provisional Measures, Resolución de la Corte, “Considerando que,” ¶ 8
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/choreachi_se_01.pdf;
Asunto Pobladores de las Comunidades del Pueblo Indígena Miskitu de la Regíon Costa Caribe
Norte, Provisional Measures, Resolución de la Corte, “Considerando que,” ¶ 6-8 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.refworld.org.es/pdfid/5ba272ef0.pdf; Asunto del Complejo Penitenciario
de Pedrinhas, Provisional Measures, Resolución de la Corte, “Visito,” ¶ 5 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov.
14, 2014), www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/pedrinhas_se_02.pdf; Matter of Danilo Rueda,
Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, “Having Seen,” considering” ¶ 5 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. May
28, 2014), www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/rueda_se_01_ing.pdf; Matter Involving Two Girls from
the Indigenous People Taromenane in Voluntary Isolation, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court,
“”Having Seen,”” ¶ 4-7 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 31, 2014),
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/taromenane_se_01_ing.pdf; Matter of Castro Rodríguez,
Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, “Having Seen,” ¶ 7 (Inter. Am. Ct. H.R. Feb. 13, 2013),
www.coreteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/castrorodrigez_se_02_ing.pdf; Matter of Guerrero-Larez,
Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, “Considering” ¶ 6-8 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 17, 2009),
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/larez_se_01_ing.pdf; Matter of A.J. et al., Provisional Measures,
Order of the Court, “Having Seen,” ¶ 5 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2009),
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/aj_se_03_ing.pdf.
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substance (fondo) of a case, the Inter-American Court, in a sense, has rewritten
the American Convention. The Court is no longer limited to decisions on cases,
but a prima facie showing of a serious and urgent violation of human rights that
will inflict irreparable harm to a person is sufficient for provisional measures to
be granted.107 As of July 2011, the Court ordered provisional measures in
ninety-one different instances that included approximately 25,000
beneficiaries.108 Both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
Court explicitly order these interim measures and justify doing so in order to
“save lives.” This delinking of measures from the substance of cases has also
occurred at the International Court of Justice, which we will return to now.
VI. ICJ: GAMBIA V. MYANMAR
As mentioned earlier, the International Court of Justice exists to resolve
disputes between and among States that are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the ICJ Statute, the Court has no specific powers to protect the rights
of any individuals. Article 41 of the ICJ Statute empowers the Court to order
“any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.”109 The Rules of Court indicate that a request for
provisional measures shall have priority over all other cases and that a hearing
“shall be convened forthwith for the purpose of proceeding to a decision on the
request as a matter of urgency.”110
Like the Inter-American system, the ICJ provisions require a finding of
gravity and urgency and the danger of irreparable harm.
In an order issued in Gambia v. Myanmar, on January 23, 2020, the ICJ
found “that there is a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights
invoked by The Gambia.” In determining the risk of irreparable harm, the ICJ
stated that it did not consider that the exceptional gravity of the allegations
warrant the determination, at this stage of the proceedings, of the existence of a
genocidal intent. In the Court’s view, all the facts and circumstances presented
were sufficient to conclude that the rights claimed by The Gambia and for which
it is seeking protection, namely the right of the Rohingya in Myanmar and of its
members to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts
mentioned in Article III, and the right of The Gambia to seek compliance by
Myanmar with its obligations not to commit, and to prevent and punish genocide
in accordance with the Convention, are “plausible.”
According to Shabtai Rosenne, “the Court requires the party making the
request to establish the existence of a case in which the Court has prima facie

107 Article 63(2) ACHR contemplates the existence of a case to enable the granting of provisional
measures. It provides that the Court shall adopt provisional measures “in matters it has under
consideration” and then goes on to explain that if the case is either before the Court, or the case has
not yet been submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission, which is expected to
submit the case to the Court. See American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica” (B-32), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
108 Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 298.
109 ICJ Statute supra note 30, at art 41.
110 Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J., Acts & Docs., at art. 74(2), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/rules.
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jurisdiction over the merits of the claim that the party is advancing.”111 This
should be compared to Pasqualucci, who wrote that:
The ICJ need not satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the
merits of the case. A prima facie basis of jurisdiction would
accord with the Inter-American Court’s holding that, when the
case has not yet been submitted to the Court, it is not necessary
that a petition even be filed before the Inter-American system
for the Commission to request that the Court has issued
provisional measures. It is only necessary that a prima facie
possibility of a grave and urgent violation of human rights is
shown.112
Since the crime of genocide requires “genocidal intent,” and the Gambia
failed to specify that any number of Rohingya had been killed, or that Gambia
exhibited “genocidal intent,” it is difficult to understand why members of the
Rohingya in Myanmar need to be protected from acts of genocide.113 If anything,
it appears that the Rohingya were victims of ethnic cleansing, but not genocide.
Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar in the International Court
of Justice in November 2019 and requested provisional measures on behalf of
some 600,000 Rohingya who are still in Myanmar and did not flee to Bangladesh
(Gambia v. Myanmar case). In 2016-2017 approximately 740,000 members of
the Rohingya minority were brutally chased out of Myanmar by the Myanmar
military and security forces, who began systematic “clearance operations”
during the course of which they committed mass murder, rape and other forms
of sexual violence and engaged in the systematic destruction by fire of Rohingya
villages, often with inhabitants locked inside. The Gambia charged that
Myanmar’s actions constituted a violation of its obligations under the Genocide
Convention, which Myanmar denied, arguing the absence of any genocidal
intent. Myanmar pointed out that it was engaged in repatriation initiatives
through UNHCR and was ready to take back thousands of Rohingya. The
Rohingya, for their part, are unwilling to return. How this can be a UNHCR
initiative is beyond comprehension, for if the ICJ determines that these
“clearance” acts constituted genocide; it would be like repatriating Nazi
concentration camp survivors back to Nazi Germany.
The ICJ granted Gambia’s request and noted in its Order that for the
purposes of provisional measures it is not called upon to establish whether
Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention, but simply to decide whether the
circumstances exist to require the issuance of provisional measures. The ICJ’s
Order unanimously called on Myanmar to “take all measures” to prevent the

111 Shabtai Rosenne, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005, 1382 (4th
ed. 2006).
112 Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 255.
113 The Genocide Convention defines “genocide” as: “any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Killing members
of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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commission of all acts defined as genocide by the Genocide Convention, without
determining that the acts that Myanmar had committed during the “clearance
operation” constituted genocide.
Again, in this case I believe the separate opinion of ICJ Vice-President Xue
supports my argument. Judge Xue does not think the subject matter of the case
is genocide because of the lack of genocidal intent, the decisive element in
proving genocide. She argued that in order to find jurisdiction under the
Genocide Convention, the Court must determine prima facie that the subjectmatter of the dispute could possibly concern genocide. Although the violations
are appalling, she continued, the fact that Bangladesh is seeking “a durable
solution” in cooperation with Myanmar indicated that the present case could not
possibly suggest a case of genocide. Yet Judge Xue’s doubts about the Court’s
jurisdiction, the standing of the applicant and the admissibility of the case did
not inhibit her from voting in favor of the Court’s unanimously approved Order
because “there were serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law against the Rohingya” and considering the gravity and scale
of the offenses, measures to ensure that Myanmar observe its obligations under
the Genocide Convention “should not be deemed unwarranted.” Judge Xue’s
explanation of voting in favor of the Order, despite her belief that the ICJ lacks
jurisdiction because the subject matter of the case is not genocide, echoes Judge
Oda’s explanation in voting in favor of the Order for provisional measures in the
LaGrand case.
CONCLUSION
As a result of COVID-19, the ICJ published an Order dated May 18, 2020,
which pushed back the due dates for the submission of the respective Memorials
on the pending case of the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) to October 23,
2020 for the Gambia, and July 23, 2021 for Myanmar. This delay means that
we will not have the ICJ’s judgment in this case until well into 2021 at the
earliest.
This paper has argued that international human rights bodies, such as the
Inter-American Commission, the Inter-American Court and the International
Court of Justice, have neglected the formal requirements of international law
when confronted with situations of necessity in which individuals find
themselves facing urgent and serious risk of irreparable harm. Rather than
concede the lack of jurisdiction because the requests for urgent measures are not
within the context of a case, or not within the jurisdiction of the overarching
treaty, these bodies have issued urgent measures in order to do something and
hopefully, to save lives.
This product of necessity and practice places the individual at the center—
as the overriding concern of international human rights law. Necessity and
practice have rewritten the procedures on the granting of urgent measures and
focused solely on the urgency, seriousness and irreparability of the harm caused
to persons, and they have managed to save thousands of lives. Who can
complain that they rewrote the law in doing so?

